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Non-Technical Summary 
 
 
In this paper, transaction costs of German firms, regulated under the EU emissions 
trading scheme (EU ETS) are examined empirically. Introduced in 2005, the EU ETS 
currently regulates carbon dioxide emissions of roughly 11,000 installations in the 27 
EU member states, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Its aim is to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in energy intensive industry branches and utility 
companies by 21 percent until 2020 compared to 2005. 
 
Transaction costs can be seen as costs for managing the EU ETS and carrying out 
necessary administrative tasks. As the data reveal, transaction costs depend on annual 
emissions and annual volumes of traded emissions allowances of firms in a non-
linear fashion, based on OLS and nonparametric estimation. This implies the 
presence of scale economies in the management of the EU ETS. Overall transaction 
costs increase for firms that have emissions levels ranging from zero to 
approximately one million tons of CO2 emissions per year. Overall transaction costs 
decrease for firms with more than one million tons of CO2 emissions (see figure 3). 
Based on the results, overall annual transaction costs for all German firms regulated 
under the EU ETS are estimated at 8.7 EUR million c.p. in average. 
 
In contrast to assumptions made by standard economic theory, marginal transaction 
costs also depend on annual emissions levels and annual trading volumes 
respectively. This implies that firms also take the costs of managing the EU ETS and 
costs for general administrative obligations into account when minimizing costs 
under the EU ETS. As a consequence, the firm’s incentives for greenhouse gas 
abatement are different than in a ‘first-best’ case with zero transaction costs. In 
practice, firms with less than one million tons of annual emissions (which do not 
profit from economies of scale in the management) will emit less (abate more) than 
emitters with more than one million tons of annual emissions. Although the changes 
are small and will not affect environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS, economic 
efficiency is decreased by transaction costs, resulting in a welfare loss.  
 
The average transaction costs (transaction costs divided by annual emissions) are 
highly different for firms of different sizes. Average transaction costs are relatively 
high for smaller emitters (up to EUR 1.00 per ton CO2), but trickle down with rising 
annual emissions of a firm. At low emissions levels, such as 5,000 or 10,000 tCO2 
p.a., doubling emissions leads to a reduction of average transaction costs by almost 
50 percent (see figure 2). 
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
 
In diesem Arbeitspapier werden Transaktionskosten deutscher Unternehmen im EU 
Emissionshandel (EU EHS) empirisch untersucht. Seit 2005 werden im EU EHS die 
CO2 Emissionen von etwa 11.000 Anlagen in den 27 EU Mitgliedsländern, 
Norwegen, Lichtenstein und Island reguliert. Ziel ist es bis 2020 eine Reduktion des 
Treibhausgasausstoßes um 21 Prozent im Vergleich zu 2005 zu erreichen.  
Transaktionskosten können als Kosten gesehen werden, die beim Management und 
anderer administrativer Aufgaben durch das EU EHS in regulierten Unternehmen 
entstehen. Wie die Daten zeigen, sind diese Kosten  in nicht-linearer Weise abhängig 
von den jährlichen Emissionen und Handelsmengen an Emissionsrechten eines 
Unternehmens, basierend auf OLS und nichtparametrischen Schätzmethoden. Dies 
bedeutet, dass Größenvorteile beim Management des EU EHS bestehen dürften. Die 
gesamten Transaktionskosten nehmen bis zu einer Emissionsmenge von etwa 1.000 
KtCO2 pro Jahr stetig zu, nehmen jedoch ab mit Emissionsmengen größer als 1.000 
KtCO2 (siehe Grafik 3). Basierend auf den Ergebnissen der Schätzung dürften die 
gesamten jährlichen Transaktionskosten, die Unternehmen in Deutschland durch das 
EU EHS entstehen, bei im Durchschnitt c.p. gut 8,7 Millionen EUR liegen. 
Entgegen üblicher theoretischer Annahmen sind die Grenztransaktionskosten, also 
die zusätzlichen Transaktionskosten, die durch die Emission einer zusätzlichen 
Einheit Treibhausgas entstehen, ebenfalls von jährlichen Emissionen und 
Handelsmengen abhängig. Dies bedeutet, dass Unternehmen bei der Entscheidung 
über kostenminimierende Emissionsmengen auch die Transaktionskosten in Betracht 
ziehen. Dadurch unterscheiden sich die optimalen Emissionsmengen in der Praxis 
von den in der Theorie angenommenen optimalen Mengen ohne 
Transaktionskosten. Unternehmen mit weniger als 1.000 KtCO2-Emissionen pro 
Jahr emittieren weniger (vermeiden mehr) als ohne Transaktionskosten erwartet. 
Auch wenn die Veränderungen im Vergleich zur Situation ohne Transaktionskosten 
vergleichsweise klein sind und die ökologische Effektivität des Instruments nicht in 
Frage stellen, so kommt es doch zu Verlusten ökonomischer Effizienz und daher zu 
Wohlfahrtsverlusten.  
Durchschnittliche Transaktionskosten (Transaktionskosten dividiert durch jährl. 
Emissionsmenge) unterscheiden sich stark zwischen Unternehmen unterschiedlicher 
Größe. Durchschnittliche Transaktionskosten sind sehr hoch für kleine Emittenten 
(bis zu 1,00 EUR pro tCO2), fallen aber schnell mit steigender Emissionsmenge. Bei 
geringen Emissionsmengen, etwa 5 oder 10 KtCO2, führt eine Verdopplung der 
Emissionen zu einer Verminderung der durchschnittlichen Transaktionskosten von 
fast 50 Prozent (siehe Grafik 2).  
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Abstract 
In this paper, transaction costs in the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) 
are examined empirically based on survey data from German companies. 
Transaction costs from measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of 
emissions, permit trading and general informational costs are considered. 
Transaction costs from MRV and permit trading are of non-linear form and 
dependent on annual emission and trading volumes based on OLS and non-
parametric estimation. As a consequence of non-linear transaction costs, 
welfare losses occur compared to a first-best setup under zero transaction 
costs. In practice, smaller emitters will emit less (abate more) compared to 
larger emitters and vice versa due to economies of scale in the management of 
emissions trading. The results further imply that optimal firm size might be 
influenced by transaction costs in the EU ETS because of relatively high 
average transaction costs amongst smaller emitters. Overall annual transaction 
costs in the EU ETS in Germany are estimated to be EUR 8.7 million. 
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1. Introduction 
Since long there has been a discussion in the economic literature about ‘frictions’, which are 
effects that hamper or at least influence economic activities and do not fit into existing theory. 
Hicks (1935) called for a more precise definition of ‘frictions’ and was the first who interpreted 
frictions as costs (Klaes, 2000). Although Coase (1937) related the existence of firms to their 
capability to facilitate certain transactions more efficiently and less costly than it would be the 
case on the open market, he did not use the phrase ‘transaction costs’ at all. In contrast, costs of 
transacting played a prominent role in monetary theory and literature on financial markets in the 
1950s and 1960s0F1. In the 1970s a branch of economic literature evolved, labeled ‘economics of 
organization’. Probably one of the most prominent early contributions in the field was made by 
Williamson (1971). By putting in focus possible market failures and organizational response to 
those ‘frictions’, a new field of research evolved, which still is growing.  
From the perspective of public and welfare economics, transaction costs might be of interest in 
two aspects. First, because transaction costs might lead to unexpected ‘frictions’, e.g. under 
environmental regulation, and thus cause welfare losses compared to a first-best world with zero 
transaction costs1F2. This neoclassical notion of transaction costs is widely accepted and policy-
evaluations often aim to account for market failure, including the consequences of transaction 
costs. A second aspect, however, seems to be omitted in the current literature on transaction 
costs under environmental regulation. Namely, that not only economic agents react to ‘frictions’ 
so that welfare losses might occur, but also organizations, such as firms, adapt to those ‘frictions’, 
consequently changing the overall market structure (Solomon, 1999).  
Given the growing popularity of quantity regulation in climate policy, organizational response to 
policy induced ‘frictions’ beyond aspects like carbon leakage etc. is by no means trivial. If, for 
example, transaction costs from environmental regulation are non-linear, alter the marginal 
condition for cost-minimization of firms and have a more severe impact on smaller firms or 
emitters compared to larger ones, then those policy induced ‘frictions’ could lead to larger 
optimal firm-size or larger optimal size of regulated sources of emissions in equilibrium. 
Consequently, it could also represent a barrier for incumbents to enter the market. Both effects 
could have negative impacts on the economy by fostering market concentration and weakening 
competition.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of transaction costs on firms under quantity 
regulation based on the example of the European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). Special 
attention will be paid to the functional form of transaction costs, e.g. if they are of non-linear 
structure, which would imply economies of scale in the management of the EU ETS on the firm 
level and could induce efficiency losses (Hanemann, 2009). This paper analyses transaction costs 
under given regulation, also implying under given externalities that stem from preexisting 
transaction costs which prevent proper internalization (Coase, 1960; Dahlman, 1979). 
                                                            
1 Costs for transacting motivated inter alia the contributions of Marschak (1950), Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) 
and authors from theoretical or mathematical economics, such as Foley (1970). As summarized by Klaes (2000) this 
‘neoclassical’ branch of literature is frequently omitted in the discussion on transaction costs. In fact, the existing 
body of literature on transaction costs is large. See Allen (2000) for an extensive summary. 
2 It has to be noted that the existence of externalities, and hence, the need for regulation is expected to stem from 
the existence of transaction costs. If the costs of transacting and setting up contracts would be zero, possible Pareto 
improvements could be realized by bargaining of self-interested economic agents (Coase, 1960; Dahlman, 1979). 
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Consequently, transaction costs, e.g. in a scheme of tradable permits, represent a second-moment 
of the costs of transacting and can be expected to generate externalities themselves. This also 
implies that if transaction costs are present under regulation, it will fail to fully internalize market 
distortions.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides an overview of the EU ETS and aims to 
highlight possible sources of transaction costs under the current design of the trading scheme. 
The general discussion on transaction costs and tradable permits is wrapped up in Section 3. The 
section also provides a brief expansion of existing approaches to transaction costs to the EU 
ETS. Based on firm-level data from Germany, which are described in Section 4, the impact of 
transaction costs on regulated firms is examined empirically in Section 5. The empirical results 
and their implication for theory and practice are discussed in Section 6 and section 7 provides a 
short conclusion.  
 
2. The EU ETS in Practice 
Introduced in 2005, the EU ETS currently regulates carbon dioxide emissions of roughly 11,000 
installations in the 27 EU member states, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Its aim is to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in energy intensive industry branches and utility companies by 
21 percent until 2020 compared to 2005. The first three years (2005 to 2007) served as a trial 
phase, characterized by economy-wide over-allocation of freely distributed permits. EU member 
states were obligated to distribute at least 95 percent of permits for free. With the start of the 
Kyoto commitment period in 2008, the second trading phase of the EU ETS started. In 2008, 
the overall cap on emissions was decreased. Member states were expected to distribute at least 90 
percent of permits for free in the second trading period (2008 to 2012). While the annual 
installation specific free allocation is fixed over the second trading period, output and emissions 
depend on overall economic conditions. In the course of the economic downturn of the years 
2008 and 2009, overall emissions dropped, resulting in a large amount of surplus allowances. In 
2008, 69 percent of installations in the EU ETS had received over-allocation. 
Given the high share of installation specific over-allocation and options for intra-firm permit 
exchange in firms with more than one regulated installation (about 30% of firms in Germany), 
purchasing of EU emissions allowances was not necessary for most firms. In Germany, for 
example, trading activities in 2009 and 2010 were modest. About half of the firms participated in 
the market for EU allowances in 2009 and 2010. Less than 20 percent of firms traded more than 
once per annum. Frequent trades, e.g. daily or weekly, are conducted mostly by very large 
emitters (Löschel et al., 2010, 2011). This implies that many over-allocated firms choose to bank 
allowances 2F3 or occasionally sell smaller amounts of permits to the market. Trading of allowances 
occurs to a high extent bilaterally  or with the help of intermediaries, such as Banks. Larger 
emitters that purchase or sell relatively high amounts of permits each year tend to trade directly at 
exchanges. Since there are a number of intermediaries in the market for EU emissions allowances 
and there are liquid exchanges, finding a buyer/seller and negotiating prices and quantities is not 
                                                            
3 Banking of allowances refers to the case when firms hold back allowances allocated or purchased in period ݐଵ for 
compliance in period ݐଶ or later. In the EU ETS, full banking of EU allowances is permitted in the period 2008 to 
2020. Banking increases flexibility in a scheme of tradable permits and fosters intertemporal economic efficiency. For 
a detailed discussion on banking see Tietenberg (2006). 
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a problem. In this aspect the EU ETS strongly differs from trading schemes established under 
Title IV of the Clean Air Act where trading of permits was associated with high transaction costs 
(Hahn & Hester, 1989).  
One of the most important sources of transaction costs in the EU ETS currently are obligations 
from monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) as reported by Jaraitė, Convery & Di Maria 
(2010) for Ireland and Löschel et al. (2010, 2011) for Germany. Firms are obligated to measure or 
calculate emissions. This process is time demanding because data on emissions have to be 
collected on the installation level and have to be analyzed for emissions reporting each year. 
Emissions data must be verified by a certified and independent third party, which generates costs. 
Finally, the data have to be reported to the national authorities in a standardized form, which 
again is time demanding. The annual MRV process is obligatory for all regulated firms in the EU 
ETS. 
Also costs from application for free allocation are present in the EU ETS. The amount of freely 
allocated permits is determined for each installation separately and for each trading period. For 
the third trading period of the EU ETS from 2013 to 2020, highly specific allocation rules were 
defined by the EU commission. Allocation will be based on product benchmarks for industrial 
installations. While there will be no free allocation for power generation from 2013 onwards, heat 
generation (often a by-product of power generation) will still be supplied with free allocation. 
Although the application process for free allocation is time demanding and costly, firms will 
receive indirect subsidies via freely allocated permits after application with a high probability. 
Consequently, costs from applying for free allocation cannot be regarded as pure transaction 
costs. In contrast, they can be regarded as an investment in a project with high probability of 
yielding a positive return. Costs from plying for free allocation are therefore not examined in this 
paper. 
Firms might face transaction costs, or more precise, informational costs when searching for 
appropriate technology for abatement and general information which is relevant for planning 
optimal abatement strategies. From 2005 to 2010, 64 percent of German firms in the EU ETS 
have scheduled abatement measures, mostly measures to increase energy efficiency. Based on the 
average lifecycle of existing machinery, larger volumes of GHG abatement will likely be achieved 
through reinvestment and replacement of existing machinery from 2020 to 2030 (Löschel et al., 
2010, 2011). While emissions trading is in general expected to incentivize innovation for pollution 
abatement in an efficient way (Downing & White, 1986; Milliman & Prince, 1989), innovations 
might occur inside as well as outside regulated companies. Especially smaller emitters might buy 
abatement technology on the market rather than innovate themselves. Also mixed innovation 
processes might occur where abatement technology is partly purchased externally and partly 
redesigned or enhanced internally based on specific needs for production. In any case, costs for 
transacting on markets for abatement technology and gathering information inside and outside 
the firm might occur. To control for informational costs related to abatement and innovation, 
these costs are treated separately in the empirical analysis. 
A special characteristic of the EU ETS is the highly uneven distribution of annual emissions 
volumes. In Germany, more than 50 percent of regulated firms emit less than 25,000 t CO2 per 
year. In contrast, there are few large emitters with annual emissions up to roughly 100 million 
tons CO2 per year. 90 percent of emissions in the EU ETS in Germany stem from 10 percent of 
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firms. This highly uneven distribution might also impact management strategies. While large 
emitters can be expected to manage tasks like trading of permits highly professional, smaller 
emitters will likely spend much less effort, given the smaller value at stake. Transaction costs 
might well explain management strategies in the EU ETS. On the other hand, the uneven 
distribution of annual emissions and differing management practices might explain observed 
patterns of transaction costs.  
 
3. Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits 
The most important contributions regarding transaction costs in schemes of tradable permits 
stem from Stavins (1995) and Montero (1998). As summarized by Hanemann (2009) both articles 
refer to transaction costs that arise from permit exchange amongst firms. Montero (1998) 
suggests: “Provided that agents willing to trade have to enter the market, find one another, communicate 
(negotiate price and quantity), and sign the corresponding legal contract, some level of transaction costs is always 
likely to exist – as in any market transaction”. Since every transaction incurs a contract, transaction 
costs are highly dependent on the requirements for finalizing a contract. As Hahn & Hester 
(1989) report, finding a potential seller for permits and obtaining regulatory approval for a trade 
was rather costly in trading programs established under Title IV of the Clean Air Act in the 
United States. In contrast, exchange of permits is uncomplicated in the EU ETS since there are 
liquid exchanges for EU emissions allowances and regulatory requirements for exchanging 
permits are low3F4.  
One of the most interesting findings by Stavins (1995) probably is, that if there are transaction 
costs that enter in a non-linear fashion into the cost function, the optimal amount of emissions 
under regulation ்݁஼∗  is no longer independent of initial free allocation received by a firm, which 
also implies that actual emissions levels under transaction costs differ from first-best emissions 
levels ்݁஼,௜∗ ് ݁௜∗. Consequently, also the permit price in equilibrium differs in a setup with and 
without transaction costs4F5. The result is of interest in principle as well as in practice. First, 
because it augments the analysis of efficiency of allocation under emissions trading by 
Montgomery (1972) and, second, because it highlights the importance of transaction costs in 
applied environmental policy, especially for the design of market based programs where 
additional transaction costs arise from permit trading. In fact, transaction costs could lead to a 
situation where marginal abatement costs are not equated amongst all regulated sources of 
emissions which would result in a loss of economic efficiency (Baumol & Oates, 1971). 
Beside transaction costs that arise from permit exchange between regulated emitters, three 
additional sources of transaction costs in regulated firms are possible. First, transaction costs that 
stem from the application for free allocation at public authorities. Second, transaction costs that 
stem from compliance, e.g. measurement, reporting and verification of emissions. And third, 
transaction costs that stem from the examination of abatement costs when several abatement 
technologies can be considered and the related costs or quantities of abatement are uncertain 
                                                            
4 The exchange simply has to be reported to the central permit registry for clearing. Current prices can be obtained at 
exchanges and might be a reference also for bilateral permit exchange.  
5 The theory has been examined in an experimental setup by Cason & Gangadharan (2003). The experimental results 
give support to the theoretical analysis.  
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(Crals & Vereeck, 2005). In sum, all kinds of transaction costs mentioned so far can be regarded 
as costs that stem from management and compliance under a scheme of tradable permits5F6. Firms 
are free to choose an individual amount of effort to spend on the different tasks as long as 
minimal requirements for compliance are met.  
Starting from the standard cost-minimization problem under regulation by tradable permits, the 
four possible sources of transactions costs can be illustrated easily. As proposed by Baumol & 
Oates (1971) and Montgomery (1972) firms are expected to minimize costs under regulation. 
Costs for a single firm depend on individual abatement costs ܿሺ݁ሻ ൒ 0, the exogenous permit 
price ݌ ൒ 0 and emissions ݁ ൒ 0. The firm faces the problem  
௠௜௡
௘ 	ሾܿሺ݁ሻ ൅ ݌ ∙ ݁ሿ.       (1) 
Deriving by ݁ yields the cost-minimizing level of emissions ݁∗ where the permit price equals 
marginal abatement costs 
  െ	ܿᇱሺ݁ሻ ൌ ݌.        (2) 
Now, several kinds of transaction costs can be introduced. Overall emissions ݁ are decomposed 
by ݁ ൌ ܽ ൅ ݑ, where ܽ is the free allocation received by the firm with ܽ ൒ 0 and ݑ is the amount 
of permits that must be purchased for compliance or can be sold due to over-allocation. 
a) Transaction costs in permit trading 
In the case of permit trading and the presence of free allocation, ݌ ∙ ݁ in equation (1) becomes 
݌ሺܽ ൅ ݑሻ. If trading of permits is associated with transaction costs dependent on the amount of 
traded permits ݂ሺݑሻ7, the corresponding condition for minimizing costs and the marginal 
condition are 
௠௜௡
௘ 	ሾܿሺ݁ሻ ൅ ݌݁ ൅ ݂ሺ݁ െ ܽሻሿ      (3) 
  െ	ܿᇱሺ݁ሻ ൌ ݌ ൅ ݂ᇱሺ݁ െ ܽሻ.      (4) 
b) Transaction costs in the application for free allocation 
Firms might face a costly and time demanding procedure of application for free allocation. Costs 
of that kind are present in the EU ETS where application for the third trading period (2012 to 
2020) is dependent on highly specific product benchmarks. Firms can be assumed to face fixed 
costs in application independent of their emissions-level. Also, scale-effects might occur in the 
process of application, leading to non-linear costs. However, since firms that apply for free 
allocation basically apply for a subsidy on a voluntary basis, the process of application could be 
seen as a highly promising lottery or a project with a very high probability of yielding positive 
                                                            
6 This definition of transaction costs is in accord with the definition made by Dahlman (1979). Possible sources of 
transaction costs under environmental regulation are summarized in detail by Crals & Vereeck (2005). 
7 Since each transaction might be associated with utility, the transaction cost functions ݂ሺݑሻ, ݃ሺ݁ሻ and ݄ሺ݁ሻ can be 
interpreted as ‘production functions’ for transaction. While the utility or service generated by ݂ሺݑሻ, ݃ሺ݁ሻ and ݄ሺ݁ሻ is 
unobserved, it is implicitly assumed that firms choose the optimal amount of transactions and consequently aim to 
minimize transaction costs given their specific needs. This also implies that observed transaction costs are optimal 
transaction costs in equilibrium. 
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returns. With regard to this, costs of applying for free allocation are not considered as pure costs 
of transacting.  
c) Transaction costs for compliance (monitoring, reporting, and verification) 
In the MRV process which is necessary for compliance in the EU ETS, firms might be 
confronted with considerable costs. These costs are likely to be dependent on emissions-levels 
with relatively high fixed costs and resulting scale economies in MRV activities. MRV costs 
would come on top, entering the cost function in an additive manner. Although MRV costs are 
not directly related to transactions, they are necessary for defining property rights and hence to 
facilitate transactions. Given the MRV transaction costs term ݃ሺ݁ሻ ൒ 0, the cost function would 
modify to 
 ௠௜௡௘ 	ሾܿሺ݁ሻ ൅ ݌݁ ൅ ݃ሺ݁ሻሿ.      (5) 
The corresponding marginal condition is 
െ	ܿᇱሺ݁ሻ ൌ ݌ ൅ ݃ᇱሺ݁ሻ.       (6) 
d) Transaction costs from examining abatement costs 
When the assumption of full information of firms is relaxed and abatement occurs in a non-
trivial technical way, firms might face costs for examining options for abatement and the related 
costs. While Downing & White (1986) showed that tradable permits are able to foster the 
introduction of cleaner technologies in production, the assessment of options to do so might be 
costly, representing possible transaction costs. Just as before those costs, denoted as ݄ሺ݁ሻ ൒ 0, 
might come on top of overall costs from regulation, yielding the problem 
௠௜௡
௘ 	ሾܿሺ݁ሻ ൅ ݌݁ ൅ ݄ሺ݁ሻሿ.      (7) 
The marginal condition becomes 
െ	ܿᇱሺ݁ሻ ൌ ݌ ൅ ݄ᇱሺ݁ሻ.       (8) 
Overall, there are four possible sources of transaction costs that have to be considered when 
examining environmental regulation by tradable permits. While cases a) and b) are limited to 
regulation by tradable permits, cases c) and d) also occur under environmental taxes,  with their 
extent depending on the design of the regulatory scheme (Crals & Vereeck, 2005). Although the 
effects of transaction costs on economic efficiency are of general theoretical interest, the extent 
to which they occur in detail is of great importance when a trading scheme is examined 
empirically. This is because resulting welfare losses are expected to be dependent on the extent of 
the costs for transacting.  
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4. Data Description 
The data used for estimation contains 150 observations and stems from two surveys amongst 
German companies regulated by the EU ETS. The data were gathered via an online-based survey 
in March 2010 and March 2011 and pooled for regression. Transaction costs were collected by 
asking survey participants about annual costs for the administration of the EU ETS. Transaction 
costs are divided in three subgroups. Costs for monitoring, reporting and verification (TCMRV) 
are the most important costs with a share of 69 percent of overall transaction costs in the sample. 
Administrative costs for permit trading (TCT)7F8 which account for 19.57 percent of overall 
transaction costs. Other costs, such as informational costs for abatement and general strategy 
building (TCINFO) account for 11.43 percent of transaction costs. The sum of all three 
categories yields overall transaction costs (OTC).  
When transaction costs were collected, survey participants were asked to put in the sum of days 
per year spent by employees for carrying out the tasks and the costs for external services and 
other expenditures in EUR separately. Days were translated into EUR by multiplying one day by 
eight hours and the average hourly costs for labor in the private sector in Germany which is 
determined to be EUR 30.90 in 20098F9. Costs from the 2010 survey were inflated to the EUR 
2011 level based on the official inflation rate of 2010 which was determined at 1.1 percent. 
Consequently, as far as costs in EUR are addressed in this paper, they shall be interpreted in EUR 
2011.  
For the analysis, 17 observations had to be dropped (not included in n=150). Four emitters were 
excluded because of extremely large emissions which are highly influential observations and have 
a negative impact on robustness. The largest emitter in the sample emits 1.9 million tons of CO2 
per annum. Emissions of the four dropped large emitters range from 4.4 to 102 million tons per 
annum. In general, annual emissions are distributed highly uneven amongst firms. In median, 
firms in Germany emitted about 25,000 tons in 2011. The largest emitter in the sample is close to 
the 95% percentile of the population, which is 1.9 million tons. At the 99% percentile in 2011, 
emissions are 8.6 million tons. This implies that the EU ETS is dominated by few very large 
emitters and a larger number of smaller emitters. For illustration, the Gini-coefficient over 
emissions in 2011 is 0.946, implying that more than 90 percent of annual emissions in Germany 
stem from less than 10 percent of regulated firms. Moreover, since large emitters are usually large 
firms in terms of operated installations and employees, surveyed persons from larger firms might 
find it hard to report on the whole company. Consequently, dropping large emitters from the 
sample increases robustness and credibility of data. Another 13 observations had to be dropped 
due to obvious errors from putting in data. As added-variable plots and a closer inspection of the 
observations revealed, surveyed persons seemed to have reported costs in EUR instead of 
workdays, resulting in massive outliers. Consequently, those observations are dropped from the 
sample for precaution, resulting in an overall number of n=150 observations appropriate for 
estimation.  
A set of independent variables is available for estimation. Actual emissions of firms (VEREM), 
which are officially verified emissions, are measured in thousand tons of annual CO2 emissions. 
                                                            
8 TCT include costs for gathering information about market conditions and costs for risk management and excluding 
permit costs ݌ ∙ ݑ. Permit costs do not represent transaction costs, but are purely ‘regulation costs’. 
9 Information on average hourly labor costs was derived from the German census bureau (Statistisches Bundesamt).  
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By using the number of freely allocated permits (ALDI, measured in thousand tons), theoretical 
trading volumes are derived by subtracting allocation from verified emissions. Resulting trading 
volumes (TVOLUME, measured in thousand tons) are defined as positive numbers, implying 
that selling or purchasing of permits is treated equally9F10. An extra dummy (DSELL) controls for 
net sellers and net buyers of allowances. INSTNR is the number of installations operated by a 
firm, DCOMB indicates if combustion installations dominate the portfolio of installations. 
DINDUS is a dummy for industrial facilities (others than utility companies). The number of 
employees is captured by the dummies D250 (250 to 1000 employees) and D1000 (more than 
1000 employees). The corresponding reference category are small and medium sized companies 
(0 to 249 employees). DTRADE is a dummy that indicates whether a firm actually traded 
allowances while DTRADEMORE indicates that firms traded more than once per year. DMIT is 
a dummy that equals unity if abatement measures were taken since 2005, DASSESS indicates that 
a firm examined internal abatement costs and DINFO is a dummy that indicates a high degree of 
information about conditions in the permit market. Finally, D2TIMES is a dummy that identifies 
firms which have participated repeatedly in the survey.   
Table 1: Summary statistics of variables used for estimation 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         otc |       150    12223.64    16763.12      991.8     119552 
       tcmrv |       150    8433.902    9008.551      495.4      71800 
         tct |        77    4659.345    13856.82      101.1   102349.6 
      tcinfo |        50    4193.832    5959.694      247.2   27774.19 
       verem |       150    187.0267    361.2069          0   1918.189 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     tvolume |       150    56.18635    126.1769   .0110016   1015.742 
        aldi |       150    233.8277    451.6961       .147   2933.931 
      instnr |       150        2.22    2.592892          1         14 
       dcomb |       150         .72    .4505031          0          1 
      dindus |       150    .5666667    .4971957          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        d250 |       150         .42     .495212          0          1 
       d1000 |       150    .1666667    .3739265          0          1 
      dtrade |       142     .528169     .500973          0          1 
  dtrademore |       142    .1760563    .3822163          0          1 
       dsell |       150    .8733333    .3337134          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        dmit |       149    .6375839    .4823194          0          1 
     dassess |       143    .3496503    .4785356          0          1 
       dinfo |       145    .2827586    .4519011          0          1 
     d2times |       150         .48    .5012735          0          1 
 
The variables VEREM, ALDI, TVOLUME, INSTNR, DSELL and DCOMB stem from the 
official EU ETS database of the European Commission (Community Independent Transaction 
Log). The remaining variables stem from the two surveys carried out in March 2010 and March 
2011. As table 1 shows, the number of observations for TCT and TCINFO is lower than n=150, 
implying that those costs occurred only for some of the firms in the sample. Dummies are 
indicated by the prefix ‘D’ for convenience.  
  
  
                                                            
10 Since actual trading volumes are private information and only a dummy variable is available that indicates if a firm 
actually traded, ‘theoretical trading volumes’ are used as a proxy for the number of permits that could be traded, 
indicating the ‘value at stake’ for each individual firm. The higher the difference between freely allocated permits and 
additional needed or surplus permits, the more effort a firm might spent on trading or considering trades. 
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5. Empirical Model, Estimation and Estimation Results 
To estimate the extent to which transaction costs occur and to identify firm characteristics that 
influence those costs, data on overall transaction costs (OTC), costs for MRV (TCMRV), permit 
trading (TCT), and informational costs (TCINFO), as described in chapter 4, are used for pooled 
regression. As argued in section 3, overall emissions level ݁௜ of firm ݅ are expected to be the most 
important driver of transaction costs for MRV and information gathering. In the case of 
transaction costs that stem from permit trading, theoretical trading volumes ݑ௜ ൌ |݁௜ െ ܽ௜| are 
used for regression. Abatement costs ܿሺ݁ሻ are private information and only actual transaction 
costs are observed. Therefore estimation takes place in a ‘reduced form’ manner. Since the aim of 
this paper is to analyze the structure of transaction costs in the EU ETS and extent to which they 
occur, a reduced form can be estimated without loss of information. The general empirical 
models are given by: 
For overall transaction costs (OTC) and cases c) MRV (TCMRV) and d) informational costs 
(TCINFO)   
log	ሺݐݎܿ௜ሻ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ݁௜ ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ ൅ ߛ௜ .     (9) 
Where ݁௜ are annual emissions under the EU ETS, ௜ܺ is a matrix containing alternative firm 
characteristics which serve as control variables and ߛ௜ is an error term which is normally 
distributed ܰ~ሺ0, ߪሻ.  
For case a) trading of allowances (TCT) the empirical specification is 
log	ሺݐܿݐ௜ሻ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶݑ௜ ൅ ߙଷ ௜ܺ ൅ ߙସܼ௜ ൅ ݒ௜ .   (10) 
Where ݑ௜ are theoretical trading volumes, ௜ܺ is a set of firm characteristics, ܼ௜ is a set of 
characteristics that relates to trading activities of firm ݅ and ݒ௜ is an error term, distributed  
ܰ~ሺ0, ߪሻ.  
Probably the most interesting aspect of the analysis is the parameterization of the empirical 
model. In practice, this implies to test linear specifications as in (9) and (10) versus alternative 
specifications that allow annual emissions ݁௜ or trading volumes ݑ௜ to enter the regression in a 
non-linear way. The reason is that non-linear specifications would imply economies of scale, 
which are of great relevance for the evaluation of the impact of transaction costs in practice.  
To test non-linearity, two different approaches are used. First, models (9) and (10) are estimated 
using OLS, including linear and non-linear parameterization for emissions ݁௜ or theoretical 
trading volumes ݑ௜ . OLS models are compared based on model-fit, information criteria and the 
RESET test for model specification. Second, models are estimated using non-parametric 
methods. Non-parametric estimation does not require any specific parameterization of the 
empirical model and may therefore be able to capture possible non-linear effects more precisely 
than parametric OLS. In practice, (9) is tested against the alternative specification10F11 
                                                            
11 It turned out that alternative specifications including ݁௜ଷor higher order cannot be applied to the dataset in a 
meaningful way and is therefore not further considered for the case of OLS estimation.  
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log	ሺݐݎܿ௜ሻ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ݁௜ ൅ ߚଷ݁௜ଶ ൅ ߚସ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜ .    (11) 
In addition, results from the non-parametric estimation are contrasted to OLS results. The non-
parametric estimation model as discussed by Li & Racine (2007) is of the general form 
  log	ሺݐݎܿ௜ሻ ൌ ݃ሺ݁௜, ௜ܺ , ߚሻ ൅ ߠ௜.      (12) 
The estimation procedure for the case of permit trading (10) is organized in the same manner.  
 
5.1. OLS Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents OLS estimation results. For all OLS estimations, robust standard errors were 
calculated since graphical and statistical tests indicated that there might be a heteroscedastic 
pattern in the data 11F12. The first four columns of table 3 are estimation results with the log of 
overall transaction costs log(OTC) as dependent variable. Testing a linear (col. 1) vs. a quadratic 
parameterization (col. 2) shows that overall transaction costs are likely to be non-linear in the 
annual amount of emissions. Larger firms with more than 1000 employees (D1000) and firms 
that actually traded allowances (DTRADE) have higher fixed transaction costs compared to the 
reference case which is a small and medium sized company that did not trade permits. 
Surprisingly, firms that trade more than once per year (DTRADEMORE) exhibit lower absolute 
fixed transaction costs. This highlights that different sources of transaction costs, e.g. for MRV 
and trading, have to be examined separately.  
Transaction costs for MRV are examined in columns (5) to (7) of table 3. Again, a quadratic 
parameterization (col. 6) seems to be appropriate for estimation based on general model fit and 
RESTET tests. Adding additional control variables that might be of relevance for MRV activities, 
such as employed technology and firm size does not significantly change overall estimation 
results. Moreover, none of the added variables is statistically different from zero. As a result, 
annual emissions seems to be the most important variable influencing transaction costs from 
MRV activities. The a priori expectation that combustion installations (DCOMB) might come 
along with differing transaction costs for MRV activities compared to other industrial 
installations was not confirmed. Although combustion installations show higher fixed transaction 
costs for MRV (0.149227), the effect cannot be considered as significantly different from zero. 
Also the number of installations operated by firms (INSTNR) and firm size (D250, D1000) have 
no statistically significant impact on transaction costs for MRV. 
Transaction costs for trading of allowances or for considering trades (e.g. information gathering 
and observation of the market) are examined in columns (8) to (10) of table 3. Testing a linear vs. 
a quadratic parameterization shows that transaction costs for trading appear to be of linear form 
when estimated with OLS. This is in contrast to transaction costs for MRV. Firms face fixed 
costs for market participation. In addition each permit available for trading triggers additional 
transaction costs. Other effects, such as firm size (D250, D1000), trading frequency (DTRADE, 
DTRADEMORE) or whether a firm is net buyer or seller of permits (DSELL) show no 
significant effect.  
                                                            
12 Residual-versus-fitted plots and Stata’s Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity were used. 
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General informational costs, e.g. for emissions abatement or information on legal aspects, are 
examined in columns (11) to (13) of table 3. The available sample collapsed considerably in this 
case. For estimation, n=48 observations are available, compared to n=150 of the full sample. 
One likely reason is that many respondents felt unable to report on informational costs, either, 
because they did not occur or, because, they are difficult to measure as they are included in other 
tasks. Neither a linear parameterization (col. 11), nor a non-linear one (col. 12) was able to 
capture informational costs properly. The most promising approach was an OLS regression, 
including several dummies (col. 13). Information with regard to the market for allowances 
(DINFO) turned out to be of significant impact. As expected, firms that have a high amount of 
knowledge and information on the market for allowances have higher fixed informational costs 
(approx. EUR 2,270 p.a.) compared to firms with a relatively low degree of information. Also 
industrial installations (DINDUS), meaning firms other than utility companies, have slightly 
higher fixed informational costs in average (approx. EUR 1,040). This could give support to the 
thesis that more complex abatement technology is needed in industrial processes compared to 
utility companies. Informational costs are relatively low and not significantly different from zero 
for larger firms (D250, D1000), firms that have actually scheduled mitigation activities since 2005 
(DMIT) or have examined abatement costs since 2005 (DASSESS). 
Summarizing the results of the OLS estimations presented in table 3 it can be concluded that 
overall transaction costs under the EU ETS are of non-linear form based on survey data 
measuring transaction costs of 2009 and 2010. This implies that economies of scale in carrying 
out transactions under the EU ETS are present (please see also figure 3). MRV costs are currently 
the most important source of transaction costs occurring in all regulated firms. MRV costs are 
also the main driver of non-linear overall transaction costs in the EU ETS. Transaction costs for 
allowance trading are treated best in a linear way, rising in the amount of permits available to sell 
or be purchased. Informational costs seem to be pure fixed costs.  
Since annual emissions (VEREM) could be endogenous, a simple Hausman test was applied. 
VEREM was regressed on the full set of control variables in eq. (4) of table 3 and additional 
explanatory variables (step one), residuals from this estimation were predicted, plugged in to the 
original equation (4), and estimated with OLS (step two) as proposed by Wooldridge (2002). 
Based on this procedure no evidence was found for VEREM to be endogenous since the fitted 
residuals in step two are not significantly different from zero, based on robust standard errors.  
 
5.2. Non-parametric Estimation Results 
To examine possible non-linear effects more closely, four non-parametric (NP) regressions are 
considered. The log of overall transaction costs log(OTC), costs for MRV log(TCMRV) and  
informational costs log(TCINFO) are examined dependent on annual emissions (VEREM). The 
log of transaction costs for permit trading log(TCT) is examined dependent on theoretical trading 
volumes (TVOLUME). Since the aim is to graphically compare OLS and NP regression (i.e. the 
sloping of the fitted regressions) and the influence of additional dummy variables is rather 
limited, no further variables are added to the NP regression.  
Figure 3 shows the fitted values from OLS reference models and non-parametric estimation for 
the transaction cost categories considered. The figure on the upper left shows that, although 
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quadratic OLS overestimates transaction costs for emission levels of 400,000 to 1,800,000 tCO2 
p.a. and underestimates for values > 1,800,000 tCO2 p.a., quadratic OLS seems to be an 
appropriate parametric approximation. The upper right figure presents fitted values from OLS 
and non-parametric estimation for MRV transaction costs. The situation is almost the same as 
described before, implying that overall transaction costs are dominated by MRV transaction 
costs. For both cases transaction costs level-off for emission levels > 1,800,000 tCO2. This 
indicates that transaction costs will, of course, not become negative with rising emission levels, 
but exhibit economies of scale. In both non-parametric regressions verified emissions turned out 
to be highly significant with a p-value of less than 1%. Corresponding R2 values are 0.14 for 
overall transaction costs and 0.17 for MRV.  
The lower left figure plots fitted values of OLS and non-parametric estimation for transaction 
costs from allowance trading. As non-parametric estimation implies, transaction costs from 
trading are highly overestimated by linear OLS while quadratic OLS underestimates for larger 
trading volumes. The figure casts doubt on the conclusion drawn from OLS model comparison 
discussed above. In fact, also transaction costs from allowance trading are likely to exhibit mild 
economies of scale, given that fitted values from NP estimation clearly show a non-linear pattern. 
In the NP estimation, the variable TVOLUME was significant on the five percent level (p-value 
0.02005), the corresponding R2 was 0.09. 
Finally, fitted values for informational costs are plotted in the lower right figure. From OLS 
estimation, the first best model appeared to be set of dummy variables, implying that 
informational costs are independent of annual emissions. The figure compared quadratic OLS to 
NP estimation. Just as in the case of OLS, annual emissions turned out to be not significant in 
NP estimation. Consequently, it has to be concluded that annual emissions do not influence 
informational costs and that OLS including dummies only is an appropriate approach for 
estimation given the available data. 
 
6. Discussion 
From the results presented above two conclusions can be drawn. First, non-linear transaction 
costs are present in the EU ETS. The neoclassical notion of transaction costs imply that this will 
lead to efficiency losses compared to a first-best case, which is represented by Montgomery 
(1972) and the related literature. For illustration, model (2) of table 3 is estimated in levels. 
Estimation results of the simplified OLS model are presented in table 2. 
 
Table 2: OLS Estimation of overall transaction costs dependent on emissions (thousand tons CO2 p.a.) 
 
  
ߚଶ:	emissions 48.78564 (3.01)*** Model: ݋ݐܿ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶݒ݁ݎ݁݉௜ ൅ ߚଷݒ݁ݎ݁݉௜ଶ ൅ ߝ௜ ߚଷ:	emissions2 -0.0246899 (-2.92)*** t-values in brackets, R2=0.1563, n=150, 
F(2,147)=4.53, *** p-value<0.01 ߚଵ:	_cons 7162.887 (6.47)*** 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Under the assumption that overall transaction costs simply add up to costs under regulation, the 
marginal condition for minimizing costs including transaction costs for a single firm becomes c.p. 
in average 
െ	ܿᇱሺ݁ሻ ൌ ݌ ൅ 0.04878564 െ 0.0000493798݁.    (13) 
Solving for	݌ yields 
݌ ൌ െ	ܿᇱሺ݁ሻ െ 0.04878564 ൅ 0.0000493798݁.    (14) 
This effectively changes the perceived marginal costs of abatement and consequently alters the 
firm’s optimal output of emissions. Given any specification of ܿᇱሺ݁ሻ or any observed exogenous 
permit price ݌, the optimal emissions level in equilibrium will differ from the case of zero 
transaction costs.  
In a nutshell, firms that do not profit from economies of scale in the management of the trading 
scheme will perceive higher marginal costs and, on the margin, emit less (abate more) than in a 
first-best cost minimum (see figure 1). In contrast, firms that do profit from economies of scale 
will perceive lower marginal control costs and consequently will emit more (abate less) than 
under a first-best situation with zero transaction costs.  
An overall welfare loss results from the fact that under conditions described above, marginal 
abatement costs are not equated among all sources of emissions. The resulting welfare loss for 
firm ݅ (see figure 1) can be determined given the marginal abatement cost curve ܿ′௘ሺ݁௜ሻ, first-best 
emissions level ݁௜∗, second-best emissions level under transaction costs ݁̃௜ , and the price per unit 
emissions ݌ which is assumed to be exogenous for convenience12F13 
∆ ௜ܹ ൌ ׬ ܿ′௘ሺ݁௜ሻ݀݁௘̃೔଴ െ ׬ ܿᇱ௘ሺ݁௜ሻ݀݁
௘೔∗
଴ ൅ ሺ݁௜∗ െ ݁̃௜ሻ݌.   (15) 
The overall welfare loss is derived by summing up individual welfare losses of regulated firms 
݅ ൌ 1…݊ 
∆ܹ ൌ ∑ ቂ׬ ܿ′௘ሺ݁௜ሻ݀݁௘̃೔଴ െ ׬ ܿᇱ௘ሺ݁௜ሻ݀݁
௘೔∗
଴ ൅ ሺ݁௜∗ െ ݁̃௜ሻ݌ቃ௡௜ୀଵ .   (16) 
 
                                                            
13 Since differing incentives for abatement might also have an impact on the permit price, the consequences of 
transaction costs on welfare might differ from (15) and (16), dependent on the distribution of firms under regulation 
and the occurring economies of scale in the management of the trading scheme. Since a broader discussion of the 
impact of transaction costs on the permit price is clearly out of the scope of this paper, the topic is left for future 
discussion. 
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Figure 2: Average transaction costs (fitted values) of firms in the EU ETS in Germany 
 
Public authorities in Germany are aware of the problem of high burdens for smaller emitters 
under the EU ETS. Consequently, several measures were taken to reduce transaction costs for 
smaller emitters (less than 25,000 tCO2 emissions p.a.), which will come into force in 2013. These 
measures include an opt-out provision given that emitters reduce a certain amount of emissions 
voluntarily. Alternatively, small emitters could be allowed to report verified emissions on a two-
year basis instead of the current annual reporting. Whether these measures will deliver the 
intended results is in the first place an empirical question. However, the underlying principle 
clearly is that uneven transaction costs shall be reduced by an uneven treatment of regulated 
sources. In the best case this would shift transaction costs from regulated emitters to public 
authorities, which can be expected to face higher expenditures in the case of a more 
differentiated treatment of regulated sources. 
When all installations regulated by the EU ETS in Germany are aggregated to the firm level, 816 
firms can be identified. After fitting the simple OLS model presented in table 2 to annual 
emissions levels of 2010, overall transaction costs of German firms under the EU ETS can be 
calculated. In sum, transaction costs from the EU ETS in Germany amount to EUR 8.7 million. 
This implies that German companies spent EUR 8.7 million for the management of emissions 
trading, including MRV activities, administrative costs of permit trades and information 
gathering.  
Finally, what is left for discussion is the possible future development of transaction costs in the 
EU ETS. As the available data show, transaction costs for trading and informational costs are 
currently relatively low (31 percent of overall transaction costs) compared to transaction costs for 
MRV (69 percent of overall transaction costs). Since the data refer to the year 2009 and 2010, 
they reflect the current situation. Future changes in the EU ETS will likely influence transaction 
costs. While most firms currently receive sufficient free allocation, it is expected that from 2013 
onward most firms will need to purchase additional permits for compliance due to strongly 
decreased free allocation. Free allocation shall be phased out completely until 2027. As a 
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consequence, an increasing number of firms, including small emitters, will have to purchase 
permits on the market, which will likely lead to increasing costs for transacting over time. 
Informational costs have turned out to be of minor importance in the current state of the EU 
ETS. Given moderate permit prices in 2009 and 2010 (about EUR 15), the incentives for firms to 
abate were moderate and most abatement actions were carried out by measures that increased 
energy efficiency and reduced emissions as a side effect (Löschel et al., 2011, 2010). Given that 
the cap on emissions in Europe will decrease over time and permit prices are expected to 
increase, firms will likely face significant incentives to lower their emissions in the future. In that 
case, informational costs, e.g. from searching for adequate technology for abatement, might 
increase as well.   
 
7. Conclusion 
Based on survey data from German companies in the EU emissions trading scheme, it was 
shown that firms face significant transaction costs from GHG regulation. Overall annual 
transaction costs in the EU ETS in Germany are estimated to amount to EUR 8.7 million. By far 
the largest share of transaction costs (69 percent) stem from measurement, reporting and 
verification of emissions. Transaction costs for permit trading (19.57 percent of overall 
transaction costs) and informational costs (11.43 percent of transaction costs) occur to a 
moderate extent under the current design of the EU ETS. Based on OLS and non-parametric 
estimation, it was shown that transaction costs for MRV activities and permit trading are non-
linear in annual emissions of a firm and annual trading volumes respectively.  
The existence of non-linear transaction costs implies that firms face economies of scale in the 
management of emissions trading. In practice and based on available data from Germany, firms 
with annual emissions of more than 1 million tons of CO2 realize such economies of scale. It has 
been shown that the existence of non-linear transaction costs leads to losses in economic 
efficiency compared to a first-best situation with zero transaction costs. Since transaction costs 
enter the marginal condition, firms that do not profit from economies of scale (less than 1 million 
tCO2 p.a.) emit less (abate more) than in the first-best optimum. Accordingly, firms that are able 
to realize economies of scale emit more (abate less) compared to the first-best case. As a result, 
transaction costs prevent marginal abatement costs to be equated over all regulated emitters.  
Another negative consequence of transaction costs in the EU ETS stems from extreme average 
transaction costs faced by small emitters. On the margin, high average transaction costs could 
lead to larger average firm size (in terms of annual emissions) over time. Given that currently 
more than 50 percent of firms under the EU ETS in Germany emit less than 25,000 tCO2 per 
annum, a large number of firms face high average transaction costs compared to larger emitters. 
For instance, a firm that emits 1 million tons of CO2 each year faces average transaction costs of 
roughly EUR 0.03 per ton of CO2. In contrast, a firm that emits 10,000 tCO2 each year faces 
average transaction costs of about EUR 0.76 per ton of CO2. It is likely that in certain cases, e.g. 
if electricity or heat is needed by a firm, small emitters may choose to ‘buy’ rather than to ‘make’ 
and stop producing electricity or heat internally. Although this does not necessarily imply a 
negative effect on environmental efficiency of emissions trading or carbon leakage, it could lead 
to increasing concentration of power in the market of permits by increased average firm size and 
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a decreased number of participants in the permit market. Such effects are likely to occur after 
several years or decades if they are present at all. Consequently, an empirical examination of the 
case has to be postponed to later years.  
Finally it has to be said that the results also have implications for price regulation (tax). The 
reason is that currently, the largest share of transaction costs in the EU ETS stem from 
measurement, reporting and verification. If MRV requirements would be the same under price 
and quantity regulation, also price regulation would incur considerable transaction costs. Since 
trading volumes, the number of trades, and the overall need for information might increase with 
a decreasing ‘cap’ on emissions and lower free allocation in the EU ETS until 2020, transaction 
costs from permit trading and informational costs will have to be examined in more detail, either 
by ex-ante numerical simulations or ex-post by carrying out empirical studies as soon as adequate 
data is available.  
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Table 3: Results of OLS Estimation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Variable log of overall transaction costs log of TC for MRV log of TC for trading log of TC for information 
 log(OTC) log(TCMRV) log(TCT) log(TCINFO) 
              
Verem  0.0006557 
(2.63)*** 
0.00285 
(5.17)*** 
0.002535 
(4.61)*** 
0.0026407 
(2.97)*** 
0.0006994 
(3.05)*** 
0.0025225 
(5.81)*** 
0.0026302 
(4.33)*** 
   0.0014252 
(1.30) 
0.0083036 
(2.16)** 
 
Verem2  -1.43 e-06 
(-5.03)*** 
-1.33 e-06 
(-4.51)*** 
-1.30 e-06 
(-2.79)*** 
 -1.21 e-06 
(-5.34)*** 
-1.26 e-06 
(-4.28)*** 
    -0.000017 
(-2.09)** 
 
Tvolume        0.0061546 
(2.72)*** 
0.0113131 
(2.01)** 
0.0068062 
(2.86)*** 
   
Tvolume2         -0.000015 
(-0.78) 
    
D250   0.0429056 
(0.32) 
-0.0024796 
(-0.02) 
  0.0115922 
(0.08) 
  -0.5195805 
(-1.52) 
  -0.5785433 
(-1.19) 
D1000   0.4232761 
(2.10)** 
0.4656723 
(2.18)** 
  0.2195526 
(1.04) 
  0.2369411 
(0.47) 
  -0.4456447 
(-0.80) 
Instnr    -0.0031589 
(-0.06) 
  -0.009469 
(-0.18) 
      
Dcomb    0.1492277 
(0.72) 
  0.2374577 
(1.33) 
      
Dindus    0.0015297 
(0.01) 
  0.1701644 
(1.06) 
     0.7543177 
(1.77)* 
Dtrade    0.2704519 
(1.79)* 
     -0.1067014 
(-0.32) 
   
Dtrademore    -0.5016913 
(-2.23)** 
     -0.5731226 
(-1.60) 
   
Dinfo    0.3304612 
(1.89) 
     0.4597088 
(1.40) 
  1.23718 
(2.48)** 
Dmit    -0.0243595 
(-0.16) 
        -0.3285184 
(-0.64) 
Dassess    0.1764047 
(1.28) 
        -0.198852 
(-0.53) 
Dsell          -0.2906519 
(-0.78) 
   
D2times    0.0236594 
(0.19) 
  0.0117424 
(0.10) 
  -0.6163033 
(-2.15)** 
  -0.0542323 
(-0.12) 
_cons 8.849373 
(118.36)*** 
8.682738 
(110.60)*** 
8.627783 
(77.06)*** 
8.290831 
(35.52)*** 
8.584661 
(127.05)*** 
8.443316 
(118.43)*** 
8.136628 
(38.98)*** 
6.913234 
(45.02)*** 
6.832152 
(40.16)*** 
7.620053 
(14.93)*** 
7.500863 
(29.09)*** 
7.21981 
(22.62)*** 
7.489783 
(14.45)*** 
              
R2 0.0750 0.1922 0.2199 0.3309 0.1056 0.2099 0.2398 0.2003 0.2107 0.3306 0.0191 0.0675 0.2352 
F 6.92*** 13.38*** 8.45*** 4.40*** 9.31*** 17.39*** 5.29*** 7.41*** 7.49*** 3.17*** 1.68 2.33 2.58** 
N 150 150 150 132 150 150 150 76 76 72 48 48 45 
DF 148 147 145 118 148 147 141 74 73 63 46 45 37 
AIC 373.4213 355.0963 353.856 314.2905 336.4578 319.8522 326.0751 250.0557 251.0607 239.7656 160.7096 160.2844 154.2136 
*** P>|t|=0.01, ** P>|t|=0.05, * P>|t|=0.10, for all estimations robust standard errors where used, t-values in brackets 
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Figure 3: Comparison of fitted OLS and fitted non-parametric estimation. The upper left figure plots fitted values of overall transaction costs (OLS reference model is no. 2). The 
upper right figure plots fitted values of transaction costs for MRV (OLS reference model is no. 6). The lower left figure plots fitted values of transaction costs for trading (OLS 
reference models are no. 8 and no. 9). The lower right figure plots informational costs (OLS reference model is no. 12). 
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